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Abstract 
In many areas of the world, a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service 
is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision. We present models of markets 
with endogenous enforcement costs, motivated by studies of rural credit markets. We show 
that subsidies may have perverse ffects under monopolistic ompetition, increasing prices 
or inducing exit. Higher prices (interest rates) result from the loss of scale economies or 
from negative xternalities among suppliers. The models are consistent with the puzzling 
evidence that infusions of government-subsidized formal credit have not improved the 
terms offered by moneylenders. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
JEL classification: 016; 017; D43 
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. . .  [it is a] nearly universal fact that the poorest strata of  the peasantry in 
many underdeveloped countries rely heavily, i f  not exclusively, on private 
moneylenders and not  on sources of  institutional finance. Indeed, financial 
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institutions like banks and credit cooperatives typically do not consider them 
creditworthy, but paradoxically enough, private moneylenders do consider 
them creditworthy for advancing loans. (Bhaduri, 1987, p. 526) 
Informal lenders are very thick on the ground. (Siamwalla et al., 1990, p. 
277) 
1. In t roduct ion  
Economists rarely discuss enforcement costs, and when they do, they usually 
1 
focus on devices, such as reputation effects, that do not directly use up resources. 
Yet in many areas of the world, the governmental institutions for enforcing 
contracts are not well developed, and a significant part of the cost of obtaining a 
good or service is the direct cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its 
provision. The purpose of this paper is to establish that with endogenous enforce- 
ment costs, a subsidy may raise the equilibrium price. The paper explores these 
issues in a context where enforcement problems are particularly acute and 
expenditures on enforcement are often large: rural credit markets in developing 
countries. 2
The logic of the argument is as follows. A moneylender, once he has screened 
an individual and assessed the likelihood of repayment, is an imperfect substitute 
for any other moneylender. Therefore, if there is free entry into moneylending, the 
market is appropriately modelled as monopolistically competitive. If the marginal 
cost of moneylenders ises for some reason, then the equilibrium interest rate 
charged will increase. The paper will show how a subsidy, which lowers the 
private opportunity cost of funds to moneylenders, may cause the marginal cost of 
moneylending to rise. We will show this in a series of three models. 
The first model is one with scale economies with respect to the variable 
transaction costs of lending. A subsidy induces new entry, and new entry reduces 
the market of each moneylender and forces him to operate at a higher marginal 
cost of transacting loans. This effect can raise the marginal cost of lending, so that 
equilibrium interest rates charged by moneylenders ise. 3 
1 Such devices are not necessarily costless. Many enforcement mechanisms require rents. The rents 
themselves are transfers, but if the transfers are accomplished by raising prices above marginal costs, 
they create a distortion that has a resource cost associated with it. See, for example, Klein and Leffier 
(1981) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). de Meza and Gould (1992) present an interesting model of 
endogenous, direct, private expenditures on enforcement in the context of a "commons" problem. 
2 See, in particular, Aleem (1990, Tables 5 and 6), who showed that in rural Pakistan transaction 
costs of moneylenders, including the costs of screening and enforcement, amounted to 39 percent of the 
amounts lent. This exceeded their capital costs - the cost of funds and bad debt - which amounted to 
27 percent of the amounts lent. 
3 This result is related to two earlier papers. Horstmann and Markusen (1986) demonstrate he 
possibility that production subsidies have no effect on prices but only on entry in a Cournot model with 
free entry, de Meza et al. (1995) extend this result in a paper written independently of and concurrently 
with this paper. The set-up of the model here is quite different. 
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The second model examines an alternative reason that subsidies may cause the 
marginal cost of moneylenders to rise. In this model, an increase in entry 
adversely affects borrowers' incentives to repay, which increases the enforcement 
effort that each moneylender must expend per borrower to ensure repayment. New 
entry thereby raises each moneylender's cost of taking on an additional customer. 
In the model, subsidies need not induce new entry, but if they do, interest rates 
may rise. The source of this perverse result is not scale economies, as in the first 
model, but enforcement externalities among moneylenders. 
What is the source of enforcement externalities among moneylenders? With a 
larger number of informal lenders, borrowers may perceive that if they were to 
default and lose access to further credit from their current lender, it would be less 
difficult to find an alternative source of funds. The threat of cut-off from future 
loans thus has less value. In a study of a moneylender in Malawi, one of four 
full-time moneylenders in his area, it was observed that 
Although ultimately bad debts are few - Mr. C. usually ends up getting what 
is due - collection is a major headache. Even so, many part-time moneylen- 
ders have entered the market ... Now that borrowers ee other places to 
turn for funds, collection problems have worsened. (Bolnick, 1992, p. 61) 
Moneylenders who are also traders and use the farmer's crop as collateral 
report in interviews that their ability to obtain repayment is reduced when, because 
of new entry, farmers' opportunities to make hidden "pirate" sales of their crop 
increases. Rice traders in Chile report that for this reason they cut back on the 
credit they used to advance to farmers (Conning, 1994, n. 17). 
Others have observed that where the number of transactors in a credit market 
expands, the informal information-sharing etworks on which moneylenders ely 
to learn a prospective borrower's credit history work less well. A view based on 
the anthropologist Polly Hill's work in Ghana is that 
a marked ecline in credit-guaranteeing by "landlords" in the Kumasi cattle 
market by the early 1960s was the result of a vast increase in the number of 
participants in the market, apparently more than could be monitored by the 
local information exchange. (Austin, 1993, p. 111) 
The third model of this paper develops microfoundations for some of these 
observations. In this model, enforcement is ensured through a combination of 
collection effort by the moneylender and reputation effects that punish defaulters. 
Reputation effects are only as strong as the information flows that support hem. In 
the model, the informal exchange of information about each borrower's credit 
history is less complete as the number of moneylenders increases, which weakens 
reputation effects. The weakening of reputation effects is a social cost of new 
entry into moneylending that takes the form of an increase in the equilibrium level 
of enforcement effort. As a result of the increase in enforcement costs, a subsidy 
that induces new entry may cause interest rates charged by moneylenders to rise. 
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The questions these models raise are important because they relate to current 
public policy debates over subsidies to rural credit in developing countries. 4
Whereas economists' intuition is that an increase in government-subsidized cr it 
that benefits informal lenders must trickle down to the clients they serve, our 
analysis hows that with endogenous enforcement costs, that effect is likely to be 
attenuated and may even be reversed. Before presenting the models, we place 
them in the context of one type of rural credit market in which agricultural credit 
policy has played out. 
2. Framework of the models 
Many developing countries have pursued policies of cheap rural credit, which 
typically provide substantial amounts of credit at low interest rates to large 
landowners, who in turn often on-lend to small landowners: these generally are not 
deemed creditworthy by the formal sector. 5 Conventional economic analysis 
suggests that a fall in the cost of funds to any group in a money market should 
lower the cost of credit to all through general equilibrium effects. Yet the 
consensus of those who have studied these markets is that in most rural areas 
where large inflows of subsidized, formal credit occurred, interest rates in the 
informal sector did not fall significantly, or at all, nor did the availability of 
informal credit increase. A well-studied example is Thailand. Despite the massive 
increase beginning in the late 1970s in formal sector lending to rural areas in 
Thailand, interest rates that informal lenders charge have been stable (Siamwalla et 
al., 1990; Onchan, 1992 and citations therein). The regulated and subsidized 
formal credit sectors in Thailand, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan charge 
interest rates of 10-14 percent, whereas for those who give interest-bearing loans 
in the informal sector, the typical range of interest rates is 35-90 percent per year 
on loans for one cropping season. Interest-beating informal sector loans, more- 
over, experience lower default rates than loans in the institutional, formal sector. 
The models of this paper are motivated by recent studies of rural credit markets 
4 Related iscussions are Floro and Ray (1997) and Bose (1994). 
5 For instance, Lipton and Toye (1989, pp. 183-184) examined projects involving rural credit in 
India and found that he majority excluded farmers with less than 2.5 or sometimes 5 acres. By this 
means everal major World Bank-assisted credit projects excluded the smallest 50-75 percent of all 
operational holdings, although t e credit was supposed tobe for smallholders. Even when a class of 
small farmers i not barred from formal credit, the fixed costs of applying for it may be prohibitive 
(Sharma, 1985; Basu, 1994). Lipton (1976, p. 547) writes: 
outside credit, especially if subsidized, rifts toward the big farmer, who is often a local 
moneylender; outside credit at 10%, by covering production costs he would have incurred 
anyway, frees his cash and thus enables him to increase consumption-lending at 18-40%. 
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in developing countries, particularly those of Aleem (1990) for Pakistan, Bell 
(1990) for India, Siamwalla et al. (1990) for Thailand, and Floro and Yotopoulos 
(1991) and Nagarajan (1992) for the developed rural areas of the Philippines; an 
overview is in Hoff and Stiglitz (1993a,b). These studies suggest striking similari- 
ties in the behavior of informal enders in areas where agriculture is commercial- 
ized. Typically, loans are an advance against the borrower's next harvest, and 
those in the best position to use that asset as collateral and to collect payment on 
debts are traders. 6 This seems to explain why traders provide the lion's share of 
informal credit. 7 
Our models recognize four features characteristic of credit markets erved by 
trader-lenders: 
1. Scale economies. There are scale economies associated with the screening and 
enforcement activities undertaken by each moneylender. For instance, there 
may exist a minimum size warehouse to perform effectively the role of a 
trader-lender. Moreover, not all enforcement costs are fixed: scale economies 
appear to operate strongly at the level of the variable costs of screening and 
enforcement (see Aleem, 1990, Table 5). 
2. Exclusivity. Each borrower is a customer of only one moneylender. 8 
3. Source of funds. Moneylenders lend primarily out of their own savings and out 
of government-subsidized funds (Bhaduri, 1987; Onchan, 1992, p. 106; 
Siamwalla et al., 1990, p. 289). Aleem found that 
6 A common pattern of enforcement is as follows: 
The large moneylenders have regular employees who visit clients to learn the harvest date. The 
moneylender will then go to the threshing floor himself or send his employee with a bullock out 
to recover the principal and interest at the threshing floor (from a study of India (Walker and 
Ryan, 1990, p. 203)). 
7 According to a survey in Nueva Ecija, Philippines, lenders who are also traders provide 63 percent 
of the total value of informal credit to cultivators (including loans between friends and kin); authors' 
calculation from Nagarajan, 1992, Tables 4, 11, and 12. In the Punjab, India, credit interlinked with 
trade represents 62 percent of informal credit to cultivating households (Bell, 1990, Table 6). Data on 
northeastern Thailand, which do not distinguish between credit to non-cultivating versus cultivating 
households, how that trader-lenders provide 32 percent of total informal credit, and 72 percent of 
informal credit from lenders not resident in the borrower's village (Siamwalla et al., 1990, Table 4). 
8 Of the borrowers in the household survey in northeastem Thailand undertaken by Siamwalla et al. 
(1990, p. 279), five-sixths reported that they borrowed from only one informal source (Siamwalla et al., 
1990, p. 279). Aleem (1990, p. 348) and Floro and Yotopoulos (1989, p. 78) note that a trader who 
lends money to a farmer generally requires him to market his crops exclusively through the trader; 
otherwise he is considered to be in default. This trade-credit linkage has been observed to be 
[t]he most important enforcement mechanism used by a nonresident trader ... The insistence on 
this trade-credit linkage makes information on the size of the borrower's operations (and their 
changes) available to the creditor and to no one else. Trade-credit linkage thus closes the 
borrower's access to other lenders (Siamwalla et al., 1990, p. 282). 
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on average approximately half of the funds used by the informal lender 
come from his own savings, 30 percent from institutional sources either 
directly or indirectly (from cotton mills, wholesalers, and so forth who have 
direct access to such funds), and the remainder from other informal lenders 
as well as from clients who use him as a safe deposit (at zero cost) for 
surplus cash. (p. 341) 
The marginal cost of funds that moneylenders reported ranged from 20 to 50 
percent (Aleem, 1990, Table 6), which reflected, in most cases, the cost of getting 
funds from other moneylenders. 
4. Monopolistic competition. The market structure is monopolistically competi- 
tive. Although a borrower's relationship with a single informal ender typically 
extends over several years, new entry of moneylenders i observed (Aleem, 
1990, p. 347), and borrowers do change moneylenders. Aleem (1990, p. 338) 
reported for Pakistan that 
on average a borrower remains a repeat customer for approximately four 
periods, beyond which the farmer generally moved to another lender or left 
the market until he again needed to borrow funds. 
Aleem undertook a direct test of the market structure of informal credit. In his 
detailed study of the operations of 14 informal enders serving a rural area in Sind, 
Pakistan, he found that (i) on average, the marginal cost of lending as a fraction of 
the amount recovered was much less than the interest rate reported by borrowers, 
but (ii) total costs of lenders as a fraction of the amount recovered were 
comparable to the average interest rate. Competition drives profits down despite 
the market power of moneylenders. 
Throughout he paper, our modelling framework has large landowners and 
small landowners. The large landowners are endowed with liquid capital K and 
obtain a government-subsidized credit ration G from a bank or other formal 
lending institution. The small landowners are deemed to offer insufficient collat- 
eral or to impose too high transaction costs to obtain credit from the formal 
sector. 9 Large landowners are able to lend to small landowners if they pay a cost 
~, which gives them the capacity to screen borrowers and act as collection agents. 
We will call them moneylenders (although moneylending is not their only 
activity). Fig. 1 shows the flows of credit in the economy. 
Our central results can be conveyed using the familiar diagram of Chamber- 
linian monopolistic ompetition in Fig. 2. For any given number of moneylenders, 
9 Our approach t us differs from Jain (1995), where neither enforcement problems nor transaction 
costs bar any set of borrowers from the formal sector. The empirical feature he focuses on is that small 
and medium-scale industry and trading firms in developing countries typically obtain substantial 
amounts of credit from both the formal sector (banks and other institutions) and informal lenders. 
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Fig. 1. Flows of credit 
each perceives a downward sloping demand curve for credit, L, as a function of 
the interest rate, i. Let 1 /E  denote the elasticity of the perceived inverse demand 
curve (e = - [dL /d i ] i / L ) .  The moneylender's average cost curve is U-shaped 
because of the fixed cost of being a moneylender and the increasing opportunity 
costs of capital diverted from his own land or other investment activities. An 
equilibrium point is characterized by two conditions: zero profits implying average 
cost (AC) per dollar lent equals the interest rate, and profit maximization implying 
dAC d i 
dL  dL  
Together these two conditions imply that in equilibrium the elasticity of the 
average cost curve equals -1 /e .  The initial equilibrium is depicted in Fig. 2 as 
point E 0, the tangency between the average cost curve and the demand curve. An 
expansion of subsidized credit from banks and other institutional lenders to large 
landowners reduces each moneylender's opportunity cost of capital and thus shifts 
his average cost curve down. The figure depicts the case where the subsidy 
AC, i 
il 
• ~ demand 
,~\~- f  AC,, 
~'5 b E, ,'" ACI 
....... ~.--~-5 . . . . . .  ,,," 
Fig. 2. A subsidy that increases price (i). 
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induces new entry, which shifts inward the demand curve facing each moneylen- 
der. With either scale economies at the level of variable transaction costs (Model 
I) or enforcement externalities among moneylenders (Models II and III), we will 
show that the increase in the number of moneylenders may increase the marginal 
cost of lending. Now, a higher marginal cost reduces the slope of the average cost 
curve. If at the original interest rate, the elasticity of the average cost curve fails 
(in absolute value) relative to the value 1 /e  of the new demand curve, then the 
new demand curve must cut the new average cost curve from above, as at point b; 
at that point, marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue and each moneylender has 
an incentive to raise his interest rate. The new equilibrium will be reached at a 
higher interest rate (as at i~) after further entry occurs and each moneylender 
moves up his average cost curve. 10 
3. Model I: scale economies 
This section presents a model where the moneylender has monopoly power 
over his share of the market. We show that if there are scale economies in the 
variable costs of lending, then an increase in subsidized formal credit may 
perversely raise the interest rate charged by moneylenders. 
3.1. Assumptions 
3.1.1. Market structure 
There are a large number of potential borrowers, many of whom are not 
creditworthy. 11 Before a moneylender screens a borrower, he cannot make a 
credible commitment with respect o the interest rate he will charge, and there is 
random matching between large landowners who have chosen to become mon- 
eylenders and individuals who seek a moneylender. (Model II relaxes these two 
assumptions.) Each moneylender screens his set of clients and learns who is 
creditworthy that period. There are enough idiosyncratic events that creditworthi- 
ness may change from period to period. At any one time, a farmer can be screened 
by only one moneylender. After the screening is done, the moneylender charges 
10 In Model II, the average cost curve of each moneylender depends on the total number of 
moneylenders. New entry shifts up the average cost curve and changes its elasticity. For clarity, Fig. 2 
depicts only one shift in the average cost curve. 
ll "Creditworthiness" imply refers to the likelihood that a loan will be repaid. Since enforcement is 
endogenous, in principle aborrower could be creditworthy with respect to one moneylender and not 
with respect to another. As described below, in this simplified model a borrower iseither creditworthy 
in the informal sector (repays his loan) or not. 
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the monopoly price to individuals found creditworthy. 12~ 13 In the next period the 
process is repeated. 
The model can be thought of as a three-stage game, where first large landown- 
ers decide whether to become moneylenders; then small landowners who are 
seeking credit are randomly distributed among moneylenders, who screen them; 
and then interest rates and loans get determined. Small landowners can switch 
after the initial pairing, but in equilibrium they will not wish to. 
3.1.2. Costs 
There is a cost 6(L) per period to obtain the capacity to screen borrowers and 
act as a collection agent, with 6(0) > 0, 6' > 0, and 6" < 0. It is assumed that the 
fixed cost 8(0) is high enough that not all large landowners choose to be 
moneylenders. The assumption of a fixed cost can be given a simple interpretation. 
Where screening and enforcement are accomplished by serving as a small farmer's 
trader or miller, 6(0) includes the cost per period of a minimum size warehouse or 
mill. 
The opportunity cost of funds is the moneylender's foregone output from his 
alternative investment opportunities, whose payoff is summarized by the function 
FO, with F' > 0 and F" < O. 
3.1.3. Demand 
There are a fixed number, Z, of creditworthy borrowers in the informal sector 
in each period. The results of the analysis would be similar if Z were a function of 
the number of moneylenders, denoted N, but the calculations would be consider- 
ably more complex. 14 Each of these 2 borrowers has a demand for funds, z(i), 
with z' < 0 and z" less than an upper bound implicitly defined by the second-order 
condition in (3), below. For notational convenience, for the remainder of this 
paper, i -- (1 + the interest rate charged). 
We will focus on the symmetric equilibrium, where each moneylender has 
Z/N borrowers. Define Z/N-m.  A moneylender who charges i thus lends 
L = mz(i). 
12 Aleem (1990, p. 335) found that on average the screening process by an informal ender takes one 
year (two seasons) during which the potential borrower, by marketing his output hrough the lender, 
demonstrates his productivity. On average, a lender then rejected more than half of the applicants 
screened. 
13 This corresponds to the general result that with strictly positive switching costs, sellers charge 
monopoly prices. This can be seen most easily in the case of the symmetric equilibrium. If all sellers 
charged a price slightly below the monopoly price, it would pay any seller to raise its price by an 
amount less than the switching cost. Each thus raises its price, until the monopoly price is attained. See 
Diamond (1971). 
~4 Our results depend only on the property that when moneylenders attempt to recruit more "good" 
borrowers, they face increasing marginal costs. The consequence of this property is that a one percent 
increase in the number of moneylenders must induce a less than one percent increase in the total 
number of borrowers. New entry thus reduces the market of each moneylender. 




Fig. 3. At the equilibrium number of moneylenders,N, the utility of a moneylender is the same as that 
of a large landowner who is not a moneylender. 
3.2. Market equilibrium 
Consider first the large landowner's decision to enter the moneylending activ- 
ity. If he specializes in farming, his end-of-period income and utility are 
H( G) - F( K + G) - rG 
where r -  (1 + the formal sector interest rate). That is, a large landowner who 
borrows G from a formal lender repays rG. If he enters the moneylending 
activity, his income and utility are 
V( N,G) =-Max{miz + F( K + G-  6 -  mz)} - rG 
i 
where miz is the principal and interest received from moneylending; and 6 + mz 
is the amount spent on the moneylending activity, leaving K + G - 6 - mz for 
alternative investments. Given G, the moneylending market is in equilibrium if the 
returns to moneylenders are equal to the returns to large landowners who are not 
moneylenders: 15
V( N,G) = H( G) (1) 
The equilibrium number of moneylenders can be read off Fig. 3 at point N. 
Before considering the slope of the V-curve, recall that the marginal cost of 
15 We employ the usual assumption that N can be treated as a continuous variable without substantial 
error. That is, we ignore problems associated with the fact that N must be an integer. (Formally, N is 
the largest integer such that V(N,G) > H(G).) 
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lending an extra dollar is the opportunity cost of funds (F ' )  plus the marginal 
transaction cost (F '6 ' ) .  Let c(L,G) denote their sum: 
c( L,G) =- F'[ I + 6 '1 
and notice that c L = 6"F ' -F" [1  + 6'] 2. This says that the marginal cost of 
lending, c, is decreasing (increasing) as the effect of scale economies in transac- 
tion costs is greater than (less than) the effect of the increasing opportunity cost of 
capital, c c < 0 implies that to operate on a larger scale in moneylending is to 
have a lower marginal cost of lending. 
The curve of the moneylender's utility slopes down, as depicted in Fig. 3, since 
V s = - [m/N] [ i  - c]z < 0. As the number of moneylenders increases, each mon- 
eylender loses m/N customers in the new symmetric equilibrium, entailing a loss 
at a given interest rate of [i - c]z per customer. 
The moneylender's first-order condition is 
z ' [ i - c ]+z=O (2) 
The moneylender sets his interest rate so that the foregone gain because each 
customer reduces his borrowing is just offset by the marginal increase in profits on 
the initial loan size. The second-order condition is 
A - :z '  + z" [ i -  c] -- cLm[ z ' ] :  < 0 (3) 
This says nothing more than that "the moneylender's marginal revenue curve cuts 
the marginal cost curve from above." 16 The second-order condition rules out two 
potential problems: even if the marginal revenue curve is downward sloping, as 
expected, the marginal cost curve might be even more downward sloping because 
of scale economies; and the marginal revenue curve might not be downward 
sloping. 
To summarize, (1) implicitly defines the equilibrium number of moneylenders 
as a function of G, and (2) implicitly defines the equilibrium interest rate they 
charge as a function of N and G: i = i (N(G),G). The model thus has a simple, 
separable structure: government subsidies affect entry into moneylending, and the 
two together determine i. The entire equilibrium can be depicted as in Fig. 4(A or 
B) for a given value of G, say G 0. The intersection at point a' of the solid curves 
representing V(N,G o) and H(G o) determines the number of moneylenders, and 
16 Proof: The marginal revenue curve MR (defined as the change in revenues as L changes) cuts the 
0 
marginal cost curve from above only if ~z (MR- c) < 0 or, writing this in terms of the interest rate. 
0 
~z (MR- c)> 0. Writing the latter inequality explicitly, we have 
0 [ z(i) ~ z"z 
-- l i+ - - -  c(L G)/ = 2 - - - -  ccmz' > 0 
Oi ~ z'(i) ' ] Z'Z' 
Rearranging and using (2) yields (3). 
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new envy  
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Fig. 4. This figure incorporates the effects of a change in G on three different curves: V, H, and i. An 
increase in G shifts the i curve down and the H and V curves up, as shown in each panel. The 
short-run effect (from point a to point b) is always to lower the informal interest rate. But the long-run 
effect on the interest rate (point c) is ambiguous. (A) Here, entry is induced and the movement along 
the i(N,G) curve more than offsets the short-run fall in i. (B) Here, though entry is induced, the 
movement along the i(N,G) curve is not sufficient o offset the short-run fall in i. 
the equi l ibr ium interest rate they charge can then be read of f  of  the i(N,G o) curve 
at point a. The next paragraph analyzes the slope of  the i(N,G o) curve. 
Differentiating the first-order condit ion in (2) shows that the effect of  new entry 
on each moneylender 's  interest rate is 
L 
- -  Z ¢ Oi NcL 
- - - -  ~0asc  L><0 (4 )  
ON -A  
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New entry reduces each money lender ' s  market  at a g iven interest rate by 
L/NAN.  Accord ing to whether  marg ina l  costs are decreas ing (or increasing),  
operat ing on a smal ler  scale impl ies a h igher  ( lower)  marginal  cost of  lending, 
which raises ( lowers)  the interest rate that each money lender  will charge. The case 
c L < 0 in a ne ighborhood of  the equi l ibr ium is depicted in Fig. 4(A,B):  in each 
f igure the i(N,G) curves thus slope up. (The case c L > 0 is depicted in Fig. 7, 
d iscussed below.)  
3.3. Effect of an expansion in formal credit 
The initial impact  of  an expans ion of  government -subs id ized  credit, which can 
be seen by di f ferent iat ing (2), is to lower the marginal  cost of  lending and so to 
lower i: 
Oi c~ z' 
- - -  < 0 (5 )  
OG A 
This effect shifts down the i(N,G) curve in Fig. 4(A,B).  
In the long-run equi l ibr ium, there is also new entry. Di f ferent iat ing the free 
entry condi t ion in (1) with respect to G shows that 
d 
- -{V-H} =F ' (K+G-6-L ) -F ' (K+G)  
dG 
= -F" (K ) [6+L]>O 
where the first equat ion uses the envelope theorem and the second equat ion uses 
the mean value theorem (so K + G - 6 - L < K < K + G). The inequal i ty reflects 
the fact that at the marg in  money lenders  have better f inancia l  opportunit ies than 
non-moneylenders ,  t7 These expanded opportunities to lend are what is 
J7 The model assumes the absence of lending between large landowners. This is consistent with the 
observation reported in Section 2 that moneylenders lend primarily out of their own savings and out of 
government-subsidized fun s. But our results do not depend on this assumption. 
Consider, instead, the possibility that large landowners who are not moneylenders lend to those 
who are, so that capital flows from left to right in Fig. 1. Such lending would economize on fixed costs 
by permitting a moneylender to intermediate funds between many large landowners and many small 
landowners. But large landowners who lend to moneylenders also need to enforce the terms of such 
loans, and so it is plausible that they will require collateral. Now, collateral can be pledged only once. 
Assuming that there is a limit on the amount of collateral that a moneylender has, once that limit is 
reached, any increase in bank lending to large landowners (and thus any increase in the amount of their 
land that is mortgaged to banks), will crowd out intra-sectoral lending on a one-for-one basis. This 
strengthens our results. An increment in G will be offset by a reduction in lending from large 
landowners to moneylenders, and the reduction in the lending of large landowners will, in tum, induce 
more large landowners to become moneylenders. Induced new entry will be larger in this case than 
occurred in the absence of this assumption. What drives the result hat an increase in government-sub- 
sidized, formal sector lending induces new entry into moneylending is thus not the special assumption 
of no lending by large landowners to moneylenders, but only the condition that, at the margin, 
moneylenders have lending or investment opportunities that dominate those of non-moneylenders. 
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"purchased" by the fixed investment in screening and enforcement capability, 
8(0). 
The greater is 8(L) + L, the greater is the gap between the marginal productiv- 
ity of funds to moneylenders and that to other large landowners, and thus the more 
that an increase in subsidized credit to large landowners differentially affects 
moneylenders and non-moneylenders. We will now show that the greater this gap, 
the greater the likelihood that in the presence of scale economies, an increase in 
subsidized formal credit to large landowners perversely raises the interest rate in 
the informal sector. 
By differentiating (1) and simplifying using (2), we obtain the effect of AG on 
entry: 
d lnN [8+L]  z' 
- -  = F" (~ ' )  - -  >0  (6 )  
dG L z 
The total effect of an increase in G on a moneylender's interest rate is the 
direct effect plus the indirect effect via entry: 
di 0i 0i dN z'[  ~]  
+ c c - cLF" ( h ' ) [  8 + L] (7) 
dG OG ON dG A 
using (4), (5), and (6). The perverse result that informal lending falls, so 
di /dG > 0, is more likely to occur (i) the smaller is the direct effect on the 
marginal cost of capital, c c = F"[1 + 3']; (ii) the more important are economies of 
scale (the larger is -cL ) ;  and (iii) conditional on c L < 0, the larger is the gap 
between the marginal productivity of funds to moneylenders and to other large 
landowners (F" (K ) [8  + L]), 18 and the larger is the elasticity of the demand for 
credit. 
The upper part of Fig. 4(A) shows a case where the expansion of formal credit 
shifts the utility of the moneylender much more than that of the large landowner 
who is not a moneylender. The initial equilibrium is at points a and a', and the 
short-run response to the expansion of formal credit reduces the informal sector 
interest rate as shown at point b. But the induced entry (shown by the arrow below 
the horizontal axis) is sufficiently large that the movement along the i(N,G) 
curve offsets its downward shift, leading to an increase in the informal interest 
rate: the long-run equilibrium interest rate corresponding to point c is above that 
corresponding to point a. In this case, the expansion of formal credit to large 
landowners decreases the aggregate supply of informal credit, as the reduction in 
each moneylender's lending more than offsets the increase in the number of 
moneylenders. 
18 But an increase in the fixed cost of entry, 6(0), has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of the 
perverse outcome, di/dG < 0. It can be checked that, in addition to the direct effect on t~ at any given 
L, an increase in t~(0), by raising the moneylender's opportunity cost of capital, can so decrease his 
lending that he sum 8(L)+ L fails. 
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Fig. 4(B) shows a case where the induced entry is smaller in relation to the 
downward shift in the i (N,G) curve, so that the equilibrium interest rate falls. The 
interest rate at point c, the long-run equilibrium, is lower than the interest rate at 
point a, the initial equilibrium. Here the expansion of formal credit increases the 
aggregate supply of informal credit to the small landowners. 
In both cases, the government subsidy is partly dissipated as a result of 
excessive ntry into the moneylending activity. 
4. Model II: enforcement externalities and strategic interaction among mon- 
eylenders 
The idea of this section is that the enforcement effort by the moneylender to
ensure repayment from any borrower depends on the costs the borrower bears if he 
defaults - costs that may diminish as the number of moneylenders increases, for 
the reasons discussed in the introduction. This externality-like ffect on each 
moneylender's enforcement costs provides an alternative reason that a subsidy 
may perversely increase interest rates. One precise source of the externality - 
based on the weakening of reputation effects - is established in Model III. 
This section generalizes the competitive structure of the preceding model. The 
demand that each moneylender faces now depends on the interest rates charged by 
all other moneylenders. In this generalized model, because of the lower opportu- 
nity cost of funds, the initial impact of the expansion of formal credit is to lower 
the interest rate charged by each competitor. If the market structure is sufficiently 
competitive, this reduces the payoff to being a moneylender relative to the payoff 
to not being a moneylender, and so there is exit from moneylending. If there is 
exit, then subsidies are not dissipated. But the model shows that little of these 
savings may be passed through to borrowers in the informal sector because xit 
increases each moneylender's market power. 
4.1. Assumptions 
4.1.1. Transaction costs 
A moneylender has a non-pecuniary cost of effort, denoted e, to ensure 
repayment from a borrower, with the properties 
e=e(  N ,z , i )  with eN> O, ez>O,  ei>__ O, ezN>~ O, eiN>_ O (8) 
It is reasonable to suppose that the cost of enforcement increases with the size of 
the loan and the interest rate charged. But what is important for our results is only 
the effect of the number of moneylenders on e, e:, and e i. (For implications of 
other properties of this function, see footnote 20.) The analysis is simplified, 
without affecting the qualitative results, by assuming that ezz = eli = ezi = O. 
Section 5 derives a function e(N,z , i )  with the above properties as a reduced 
form of a model with reputation effects. In the model, an increase in entry reduces 
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the probability that a default becomes known, which weakens reputation effects 
and hence the sanctions for default, and thereby increases the collection effort a 
moneylender must make to ensure repayment of a given debt. 
Since this section aims to show that subsidies can increase interest rates even in 
the absence of decreasing marginal costs, set 8' = 8" = O. 
4.1.2. Demand 
As before, there are Z z borrowers with the ability to repay a loan, and each has 
a demand function z(i). A strictly positive upper bound on z" is implicitly 
defined by the second-order condition in (14) and the stability condition in (16). 
4.1.3. Market structure 
Moneylenders now make credible commitments with respect to the interest 
rates that they will charge before they screen a borrower. Suppose that a 
moneylenderis n the market with N-  l other moneylenders, all offering a given 
interest rate i. If the given moneylender raised his interest rate, we assume that his 
ability to recruit prospective borrowers would fall continuously and even differen- 
tiably. Likewise, if the rates of the other moneylenders increased, the given 
moneylender's ability to recruit prospective borrowers would increase. Finally, if 
all interest rates charged in the market were identical and fixed, while the number 
of moneylenders increased, then each moneylender's ability to recruit borrowers 
would again fall. As an idealization, we specify a function for the number of 
clients a moneylender obtains, m = m(i, i ,N),  where i is the interest rate charged 
by all others, and where m0 has the following properties 19. 
Symmetry: m(i , i ,N )  = Z /N  for all i (9a) 
Imperfect substitutability across moneylenders: 
m i < 0, m i > 0, mii > O, miN < 0 (9b) 
Stability condition: mii + mii < 0 (9c) 
(9a) states that at any common interest rate i charged by all moneylenders, each 
attracts the same number of clients. This implies that, starting from any common 
interest rate, if all moneylenders aise their interest rates by a given amount, then 
the market share of a given moneylender does not change. Differentiating (9a) by 
i and i and setting di = di, we have: 
mi( i , i ,N  ) + mi( i , i ,N  ) = 0 (10) 
It also follows from symmetry that if the number of moneylenders increases, 
19 mO can be thought of as a specialization f a more general function that depends on the vector of 
interest rates charged by all large landowners, with the interest rates et at infinity in the case of large 
landowners who do not pay the fixed cost 8 (since there is no interest rate at which, lacking the ability 
to enforce repayment, they would be willing to lend). 
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then the market share of each falls by the same amount. Differentiating (9a) by N, 
we find mN( i , i ,N )= - -m/N.  
(9b) states that moneylenders are imperfect substitutes for each other, mfi > 0 
says that if other moneylenders raise their interest rates, then the number of 
customers a given moneylender loses_by raising his own interest rate falls. The 
inequalities in (9b) imply that i and i are strategic complements (see (15)) and 
that given any initial symmetric interest rate, an increase in the number of 
moneylenders increases the competit iveness of the market (see (18)). 
(9c) is a technical condition that ensures that a stable price-setting equil ibrium 
exists (see (16)). 
4.2. Market equilibrium 
For the moneylender,  utility is now the sum of the f inancial return from lending 
to small landowners and from investing in non-moneylending activities, less the 
disutil ity of enforcement effort, e per borrower. Define the moneylender 's  indirect 
utility function by a lower case v, where 
v ( i ,N ,G)  -Max{m[  i z -  e] + F(  K + G-  6 -  mz)} - rG ( l l )  
i 
The first-order condit ion with respect o the interest rate is 
~( i , i ,N ,G)  =mi [z [ i -F ' ] -e ]  +mz' [ i - F ' -e : ]+m[z -e i ]=O 
(12) 
The three terms of ~b reflect, respectively, (i) the loss of customers, m i, 
multipl ied by the gain from lending to an extra customer, z[i - F ' ]  - e; (ii) the 
fall in each customer's loan size, z', multipl ied by the gain from lending an extra 
dollar to every customer, [i - F' - e~]m, and (iii) the gain from charging a higher 
interest rate on the initial volume of loans, m[ z - el]. 20 It will be useful to rewrite 
(12) as 
z -e i+z ' [ i - F ' - -ez ]= - m~i [z [ i -F ' ] -e ]  >0 (13) 
m 
20 We assume that e i is bounded above so that [z - e i] is positive in the relevant range. Under the 
alternative assumption, the lender's return i z -e  on a given loan size (z) would not be everywhere 
monotone increasing in the interest rate, which, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) or Williamson (1987), 
can generate quilibrium credit rationing. What is important to note here is that the lender's only 
motive for credit rationing in our model would be to reduce his enforcement costs. An increase in the 
number of moneylenders i  a change in the environment that raises the costs per borrower of 
enforcement. For eiN > > 0, new entry would switch the equilibrium from a market-clearing equilib- 
rium to a rationing equilibrium; within a rationing regime, new entry would increase the extent of 
rationing. The possibility of credit rationing in these ways strengthens the argument of this paper that a 
subsidy that increases entry may reduce aggregate informal ending. 
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i(~,No,G) 
N~ > N o 
~'0 * i 11 
Fig. 5. An increase in N may lead to an increase in i at a fixed value of i. Feedback reactions lead to a 
further increase in the equilibrium rate of interest. 
which says that the moneylender equates the gain per customer from a marginal 
increase in i to the loss from the induced departure of customers. 
As in Model I, the economic content of the second-order condition is that the 
slope of the marginal revenue curve must be less than the slope of the marginal 
cost curve (which is now -F"  > 0). The second-order condition is 
I[.li= 2mi[ z -e i  + z ' [ i -  F ' -ez ]  ] + 2z' m+ mii[ z [ i - F ' ]  -e  ] 
+ F ' [miz + mz'] 2 + mz'[ i - -  F'-- ez] <0 (14) 
Noting (13), all terms on the right-hand side of (14) are negative except the last, 
which is ambiguous in sign. As in the previous model, the second-order condition 
implicitly imposes an upper bound on z": demand cannot be "too convex." 
The interest rate chosen by a given moneylender now depends on that chosen 
by others. Differentiating (12) shows that 0i/0i = - ~bJg~ i where 
m 
~= -e i _  z[ i -  F ' -  e] + F" m~z[miz + mz'] > 0 (15) 
l 
(using (13)). i increases with i (that is, they are strategic omplements) because 
an increase in i increases the moneylender's market power 21 and because, by 
increasing his market share, it raises his marginal opportunity cost of funds (at any 
given i). 
Fig. 5 depicts the reaction function. For given N and G, the symmetric 
equilibrium in interest rates is the intersection of the reaction function with the 45 ° 
21 That is, it decreases the elasticity of his perceived demand curve for loans, • = -dln(mz)/dln(i). 
Using (9b), we find 
i mim i ] 
• ~=m[~-md <0 
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line. The symmetric equilibrium is stable provided that the slope of the reaction 
function is less than one; that is, provided that 
- ~b i > ~b 7 (16)  
(16) says that the effect on the moneylender's marginal returns ~b from a 
change in his own interest rate is larger than the effect from a change in the 
interest rate charged by other moneylenders. 22
Now consider how the reaction function shifts with new entry (an increase in 
N). Starting from any common interest rate charged by all moneylenders, and 
differentiating ~b with respect o N, we find Oi/ON = ~bN/[ - ~/ti] , where 
?n 
~b u = - eU__ [ z[ i -- F' ] -- e] -- mie N-  m[ e zu Z' + e iu ] 
l 
L 
- F " - - [miz  + mz' ] (17) 
N 
using (13). Whether ~b N and, hence, Oi/ON is positive or negative depends on 
three factors: 
1. A monopoly power  effect, represented by the first term on the right-hand side of 
(17). New entry reduces each moneylender's market power since 
] ~N = - -  - -  "~ miN > 0 (18) 
m 
This effect tends to lower i by a greater amount, the greater the moneylender's 
profits on the marginal oan, z[ i - F ']  - e. 
2. An enforcement cost effect, represented by the second and third terms on the 
right-hand side of (17). New entry increases each moneylender's enforcement 
costs per borrower (since e N > 0), which lowers the gain from winning a new 
customer and so raises i. This effect is larger, the more competitive the market 
(the greater is - mi). The term ezN >_ 0 captures the effect of new entry on the 
marginal cost of lending an extra dollar, thus also raising i. On the other hand, 
new entry changes by eiN > 0 the increment to enforcement costs induced by a 
marginal increase in i, which tends to lower i. 
3. A cost o f  capital effect, represented by the last term of (17). With new entry, 
each moneylender's lending at any given interest rate falls at the rate L /N ,  
which reduces his opportunity cost of capital by F"L /N ,  and so tends to lower 
i. 
If in (17) the enforcement cost effect is positive and exceeds the sum of the 
monopoly power  and cost o f  capital effects, then the perverse result occurs where 
22 It can be checked, using (9b,c) and (10), that a sufficient condition for (16) is that he borrower's 
demand curve z(i) not be too convex. We will assume that his condition is satisfied. 
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an increase in the number of moneylenders increases the interest rate: Oi/bN > O. 
One explanation for the enforcement cost effect, which we will model explicitly in 
Section 5, is that the informal exchange of information about each borrower's 
credit history becomes less complete as the number of moneylenders increases 
and, as a result, reputation effects weaken. As reputation effects weaken, the effort 
a moneylender must make to enforce the terms of a loan increases, which raises 
his marginal cost of lending. 23 This is consistent with observations of actual 
informal enders discussed in the introduction. This case is depicted by the dashed 
line in Fig. 5. New entry shifts up the reaction curve, which leads to a larger 
increase in the equilibrium interest rate, denoted by t (= i = i), because of the 
positive feedback. 
It remains to consider the decision by large landowners to enter the moneylend- 
ing activity. Let an upper case V denote a moneylender's indirect utility function 
in a symmetric equilibrium: 
V(N,G) =- v( ~( N,G),N,G) 
Given G, the moneylending market is in equilibrium if the returns to moneylen- 
ders are equal to the returns to large landowners who are not moneylenders: 
V(N,G) = H(G) (19) 
Assume that a stable equilibrium exists. To see the condition that guarantees 
stability, consider how the moneylender' s util ity changes with N. As N increases 
for given interest rates, each moneylender s utility v(~,N,G) changes by 
m 
v N=-~[z [ i -F ' ] -e ] -me N<O (20) 
His market share falls and his enforcement costs rise, and both effects reduce his 
utility. But because of strategic interaction among moneylenders, new entry has a 
third, indirect effect on his utility. If  ~b/v > (<)0 ,  then as N increases, each 
competitor raises (lowers) his interest rate, which makes the moneylender better 
off (worse off) since he gains from a higher interest rate charged by his 
competitors: 
v~=mi[z[i-F' ]-e] >0 (21) 
23 A model with an interesting relation to this paper is Satterthwaite's (Satterthwaite, 1979) analysis 
of reputation goods (e.g., medical services). In his model, an increase in entry reduces the information 
that consumers have about alternative sources of supply, in turn reducing their willingness to switch 
suppliers and so increasing each supplier's market power. In his model, the weakening of reputation 
effects lowers the elasticity of demand. In our model, it lowers the elasticity of the average cost curve. 
In both cases, an increase in the number of suppliers may lead to an increase in price. 
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Fig. 6. An increase in G at a fixed N and i results in a lower interest rate, as the supply of funds 
increases. With endogenous i the equilibrium interest rate is reduced even more, as a result of feedback 
effects. 
Stability requires that the total derivative of V with respect o N be negative in a 
neighborhood of the stable equilibrium, N: 24 
d7 
VN(AI'G) = VN + vi d---;;~v < 0 (22) 
4.3. Effect o f  an expansion of  formal  credit 
The case of no strategic interaction modelled in Section 3 had a convenient 
separable structure. In doing comparative statics, we could solve first for the 
change in N, and then use that result in deriving the change in i. With strategic 
interaction, the model is no longer separable. Here we present our results 
diagrammatically, leaving the proofs to Appendix A. 
As before, an increase in subsidized formal credit to large landowners lowers i 
(and thus increases informal lending) for any given i and N. The dashed line in 
Fig. 6 depicts the shift in the reaction function due to an increase in G. The shift 
leads to a larger drop in the value of i" because of the negative feedback. Thus, the 
curve describing the interest rate as a function of N shifts down, just as depicted 
in the lower part of Fig. 4(A,B). These two figures illustrate two possible 
outcomes in Model II, except that now the rising slope of  the interest rate curve 
reflects the effect o f  new entry on enforcement costs, not the loss of  (within-firm) 
economies of  scale (see Proposition 1 below). 
24 We know that V(N,G) is bounded by the cooperative solution, say V +, and that V + declines with 
N. That is, 
V + (N,G) 
=-max{m(i+,i+,N)[ z(i + )i + - e( z(i + ),i+,N)] + F( K + G-  ~ - m(i+,i+,N)z(i +))} - rG 
i + 
and from (20) and the envelope theorem, V~ < 0. The fact that V(N,G) may not be monotonic n N 
implies that here may be multiple quilibria. 







ex i t  
Fig. 7. With strategic interaction among moneylenders, an increase in G may lead to exit from the 
moneylending business. As in Panel 4B, the short-run fall in the interest rate from point a to point b, 
in response to an increase in G, is partially offset by the long-run adjustment from point b to point c. 
Fig. 7 illustrates a new possibility. The two lower curves of Fig. 7 illustrate a 
case which, in partial equilibrium terms, many might think to be more "normal":  
the cost of capital and monopo~ power effects of an increase in N dominate the 
enforcement cost effect, so that i is a decreasing function of N. The upper part of 
Fig. 7 illustrates the case where an increase in G so reduces interest rates among a 
given set of moneylenders, which so reduces each moneylender's profits, that the 
moneylender's utility decreases relative to that of a large landowner who is not a 
moneylender: a{V - H}/aG < 0, and there is exit from the moneylending activity 
(see Proposition 2 below). Just as before, an expansion of formal credit lowers the 
^ 
i curve at each N; at a given N, the interest rate moves from point a to point b in 
Fig. 7. But long-run adjustments will partially, though not completely, reverse this 
short-run effect. The fall in the profitability of lending induces exit, and the exit of 
moneylenders increases the monopoly power of those large landowners who 
^ 
remain moneylenders. The movement along the i curve from point b to point c 
for this reason offsets its downward shift, but now the offset is only partial: point 
c must correspond to an interest rate at least slightly below the initial interest rate 
at point a (Proposition 3 below). 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. Exit occurs if, and only 
if, at the initial number of informal lenders, moneylending has become unprof- 
itable, which (given that G has risen) can occur only if the informal sector interest 
rate falls. 
From an efficiency perspective, Fig. 7 depicts a much more desirable case than 
Fig. 4A. Fewer resources are dissipated in fixed costs of enforcement, ~(0), and in 
enforcement effort. But little of these savings may be passed onto borrowers. As 
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exit occurs from moneylending, the market power of each moneylender increases, 
which is reflected in the upward movement in interest rates along the [(N, Gj) 
curve. The long-run upward movement partially offsets the short-run decline. In 
terms of the criterion of benefitting the small landowner through lower interest 
rates, the two cases differ little. 
Appendix A proves three propositions: 
PROPOSITION 1. If the enforcement cost effect is positive and sufficiently large 
relative to the effect that new entry has on the moneylender's opportunity cost of 
capital and on his market power, then the informal sector interest rate will rise as 
formal credit increases. 
PROPOSITION 2. If there is no strategic interaction among moneylenders (m i = 
0), then an increase in formal credit will induce new entry into moneylending. If 
strategic interaction is important (mg is large), an increase in formal credit may 
induce exit from the moneylending activity. 
PROPOSITION 3. If the increase in formal credit induces exit, then the informal 
sector interest rate must fall. 
5. Model III: enforcement costs and reputation 
This section develops a reputation model from which equation (8) is derived as 
a reduced form. We can get that result even in the simple case of homogeneous 
borrowers. 
In the model, default is prevented by a combination of reputation effects and 
the moneylender's enforcement effort. Reputation effects require fast and accurate 
information flows. The importance of informal information transmission suggests 
that the more moneylenders there are, the lower the probability that the required 
information will be transmitted quickly to each, and therefore the weaker eputa- 
tion effects will be. The question that our model investigates i  how that change in 
information affects the level of enforcement effort that each moneylender must 
apply to ensure repayment. 
To investigate the question requires a model where a default in one period may 
trigger a punishment in the future: that is, we require that for each borrower, there 
always be a "next period" with strictly positive probability. To capture this idea, 
we now assume that borrowers live an infinite number of periods and have a time 
discount factor/3 ~ (0,1). 25 
25 As is well known, models with finite-lived agents where the date of the terminal period is 
uncertain have properties similar to those with infinite-lived agents. 
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Enforcement effort takes the form of visiting the borrower's farm around the 
time of the expected harvest. The level of enforcement effort might be thought of 
as the number of days before the expected optimal harvest date that the moneylen- 
der begins to visit the borrower's farm. A borrower chooses whether to default or 
repay. If he repays, his payoff in that period is ur(z,i)> 0. If he defaults, his 
payoff in that period depends on (a) the size of his debt and (b) the level of the 
moneylender's enforcement effort. The idea behind (b) is that the higher the 
moneylender's enforcement effort, the greater the borrower's own effort must be 
to evade him (or the earlier the borrower needs to harvest his crop, with 
consequent loss in value, in the situation where enforcement effort is associated 
with the number of days before the optimal harvest date that the moneylender 
begins to visit the borrower's farm 26). For simplicity, we write the borrower's 
payoff in that period if he defaults as a separable function that is linear in the 
moneylender's enforcement effort, e: U(z , i ,e )  =- ud(z , i )  -- e. We make the natural 
assumption that u d c (ur,w) and 
0 0 
~zlUd- -u  r} ~__ 0, ~ l{Ud- -u  r} ~0 (23) 
(23) says that the borrower's incentive to default on a loan increases with its size 
and interest charge. 
Notice that e is always a cost to the moneylender, whereas it is a cost to the 
borrower only if he defaults. We are interested in the general class of cases where 
(a) moneylending in the absence of enforcement costs e is profitable, that is, 
where 
mz( i ) i+F(K+ G-  6 -mz( i ) )  >F(K+ G) for some i (24a) 
from which it follows immediately that 
z [ i -F ' ]>O 
and where, at the same time, (b) the moneylender's own enforcement effort cannot 
sustain lending in a one-shot game, that is, 
e > u d -  u ~ ~ z [ i -  F']  - e <_ 0 for all i (24b) 
(24b) says that the effort needed to ensure repayment in a one-shot game more 
than exhausts the moneylender's financial gain from lending. Hence, lending is 
26 Support for this interpretation is provided by the following report: 
One type of farmer who finds it difficult to borrow from non-resident traders is the cassava- 
growers, for the simple reason that cassava, unlike other crops, can be harvested atany time 
between four and fourteen months after planting. Without a fixed harvest period, the enforce- 
ment problem becomes very difficult. (Siamwalla et al., 1990, p. 282). 
For cassava, early harvesting toevade the moneylender could thus be costless to the farmer. Without a 
means to raise the costs of evasion, the moneylender r fuses to lend. 
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unprofitable unless the moneylender can rely at least in part on the future 
penalties the borrower suffers from default. 
At the end of each period, the moneylender decides whether or not to terminate 
his relationship with the borrower. He terminates the relationship if the borrower 
defaults. If the borrower epays, the moneylender continues the relationship if he 
remains in the market. To capture the idea that moneylenders have limited ability 
to commit o future lending, we assume that there is an exogenous probability b 
that a moneylender leaves the market at the end of any period. 
An individual who is not attached to a moneylender must go through another 
one-period screening process with a moneylender. As in Models I and II, at any 
one time a borrower can be screened by only one moneylender. In that period he 
obtains no credit and zero utility. 
If a borrower has defaulted, and it is known that he has defaulted, then 
moneylenders will not lend to him, for reasons that we will see shortly (Proposi- 
tion 5, below). 
Let 7r denote the probability that a bad credit history is "forgotten" in the 
sense that an individual who has defaulted in the past passes a moneylender's 
screening test (thereby obtaining credit). For given 7r, the next proposition 
specifies the lowest enforcement effort e * that induces repayment by a borrower 
with no history of default. 
PROPOSITION 4. The best response of a borrower who has repaid in the past is 
to repay in the future provided that the moneylender's enforcement effort satisfies 
( 1 -b+f l [b -y ]  } e > u d - u r - [~u r * 




Proof. The present value of lifetime expected utility of a borrower who always 
repays and who is currently attached to a moneylender is denoted by W r: 
Wr--ur + fl[1 -b]Wr + fl2bW r
The present value of lifetime expected utility of an individual who has 
defaulted in the past, who currently is being screened by a moneylender, but who 
will repay any debts he obtains in the future, is 
W d ~- ~ ' ITW r -~- ~[1 - -  " IT]W d 
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To show that an individual's best response is always to repay, it is sufficient o 
show that 
W r ~__ u d - e + f lW d 
Substituting and rearranging yields (25). • 
The borrower's incentive to repay a given loan depends on the one-period gain 
from default (u  d - u r - e ) ,  and the difference between his future utility streams if 
he does or does not default. Default will be prevented only if the present 
discounted value of this difference between future utility streams exceeds the 
one-time gain the borrower obtains from default. Anything that increases this 
difference reduces e*. Hence, e* is decreasing in the utility index u', the 
probability 1 - b of continuing the relationship with the current moneylender if
the borrower epays, and the discount factor/3. It is increasing in the probability rr 
of finding another moneylender if the borrower defaults. 
It remains to verify that in the neighborhood of perfect information (Tr = 0), 
and any  given values of u d, u r, and b such that u d > u r > 0 and 0 < b < 1, there 
exists a set of values of /3 for which e * is strictly positive and moneylending to 
individuals with a good credit history is profitable, e* is a continuous, strictly 
monotonically decreasing function of /3. As /3 ~ 1, we have e*~-~.  As 
/3 -~ 0, e * is strictly positive. This implies that there exists a unique fl such that 
for/3 = fl, e * = 0: borrowers repay irrespective of the moneylender's enforcement 
effort since the value of a good reputation as compared to the one-time gain from 
default becomes arbitrarily large as /3 approach_es 1. For/3 < ~, e * > 0. Whether 
lending is profitable depends on e*. At /3 =/3,  lending is strictly profitable (by 
the assumption made in (24a)); hence, for /3 near /3, it is also strictly profitable. 
As /3 decreases below fl, the profitability of lending decreases. In the limit as 
/3~0,  lending is unprofitable (by the fact that limt~_~0e* = u d -  u r and the 
assumption made in (24b)). Hence, there exists a unique/3 such that if and only if 
/3 >/3  does the moneylender wish to lend to individuals with a good credit history. 
In summary, we have shown that there exists a unique subset of (0,1), denoted 
(/3,fl), such that for /3 ~ (/3,fl), the moneylender wishes to lend to individuals 
with a good credit history and e* is strictly positive. We will assume that 
/3 ~ (/3,/3). Note that/3 is a function of b, with/3 ' (b) > 0. This reflects the fact 
that an increase in the exogenous probability of separation from his moneylender 
lowers a borrower' s payoff from repaying a loan, while an increase in the discount 
factor raises it. 
Will moneylenders who operate independently of each other turn away prospec- 
tive borrowers with a bad credit history? A necessary condition is that those who 
do so expect to gain, and those who do not do so expect to lose. These 
expectations depend on the beliefs that each moneylender has about other mon- 
eylenders' strategies. By analogy with Greif's (Greif, 1994) model of merchant- 
agent relations, define a co l lec t iu i s t  s t ra tegy  as one where a moneylender does not 
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lend to individuals who he knows have defaulted in the past. The next proposition 
provides sufficient conditions for the collectivist strategy to be an equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 5. If /3>/3(b)  when b = 1, then there exists a value b~ (0,1) 
such that for b > b, the collectivist strategy combination under complete ]-nforma- 
tion is a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The proof, which is in Appendix B, depends on the assumption in (24b) that to 
induce repayment it is not profitable for the moneylender to rely solely on his 
current enforcement effort. If  lending is to be profitable, the threat o the borrower 
of a loss of future income is also necessary to induce repayment. Part of this threat 
comes from the fact that if a borrower defaults, his moneylender cuts off access to 
future credit. But for b high enough, that threat is not enough; the loss of one's 
reputation with other moneylenders i  also necessary to induce repayment. This 
means that for b high enough, no moneylender can profitably lend (at any interest 
rate) to an individual who has already lost his reputation: expectations that 
moneylenders will refuse to lend to those with a bad credit history are self-fulfill- 
ing. 27 
We evaluated the collectivist strategy combination above at 7r = 0, i.e., rapid 
transmission of perfect information. In reality, there are no credit bureaus in the 
rural sector of developing countries to ensure perfect information. 28 Moneylen- 
ders rely instead on informal information-sharing etworks. With a small number 
of moneylenders, this may work well. But as the number of moneylenders 
increases, it is plausible that the probability that an individual's credit history is 
known decreases, as suggested in the introduction. Formally, this idea is captured 
by specifying that 7r is a function of N, 7r ' (N)  > 0, with strict inequality for N 
sufficiently large. 
Proposition 6 relates the equilibrium level of enforcement effort to the number 
of moneylenders and to the terms of the current loan offered by a given 
moneylender, denoted by (zo,io). It can be proved by substituting the function 
7r(N) for the parameter 7r in (25), and using (23). 
PROPOSITION 6. If the collectivist strategy combination is an equilibrium, and if 
the probability that a moneylender has information on the past history of default of 
an individual is a strictly decreasing function of N, then the lowest level of 
27 If b < b, a moneylender could rely on only the present and future punishments hehimself imposes 
on a borrower to deter default; social sanctions (through reputation effects) would not be necessary to
sustain lending. The reason that we focus on the case b > b is that in this case, as reputation effects 
weaken, the moneylender's enforcement costs necessarily increase. 
28 Free rider problems create obstacles to the creation of credit bureaus: for an interesting analysis. 
see Klein (1992). 
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enforcement effort for which an individual's best response is to repay has the 
properties 
* * * * * * * 
e N > O, ezo > O, eio >__ O, e b > O, e~ < O, ezo N = eio N = 0 
e* is increasing in all variables that increase the borrower's incentive to 
default: the number of moneylenders, principal and interest of the current loan, 
and the probability (b) of exogenous eparation. It is decreasing in the discount 
factor, since a higher discount factor means a higher utility weight on the future 
punishment from a default. The zero cross-derivatives reflect our simplifying 
assumption that the borrower's utility is separable in the intensity of enforcement 
effort and the terms of the current loan, and would not hold in a more general 
specification. 
This section has illustrated how an increased number of moneylenders, by 
decreasing the probability that a default will be the common knowledge of all 
moneylenders, increases the enforcement costs of ensuring repayment from any 
borrower. As shown in the preceding section, in the presence of such enforcement 
externalities, a subsidy that induces new entry may cause the interest rate charged 
by moneylenders to rise. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates two ways that a subsidy may increase equilibrium 
prices in a monopolistically competitive market. There may be induced entry and a 
resulting loss of scale economies, or induced entry with negative xternalities in 
enforcement across suppliers. 
Our central case of a market with strategic interaction among moneylenders 
illustrates the tension, brought about by new entry, between the extent of competi- 
tion among moneylenders and the level of their enforcement costs. New entry into 
the moneylending activity reduces their market power, which tends to increase 
lending by each moneylender. But by weakening reputation effects, new entry 
raises the cost of enforcing loan repayment, which tends to reduce lending by each 
moneylender. Our surprising finding is that an increase in subsidized institutional 
credit to large landowners need not increase their on-lending to small landowners. 
Part of the increase in institutional credit to large landowners i  dissipated through 
excessive entry into the moneylending activity, for example, expenditures on 
warehouses. The remainder may be "bottled up" among large landowners, 
including moneylenders, because the induced new entry has driven up the marginal 
enforcement cost of lending. 
Our models are motivated by the striking similarities found in recent accounts 
of the role of traders as a source of informal rural credit. Key common findings are 
their methods of screening borrowers and enforcing repayment, heir source of 
funds, and their ability to exercise market power despite low barriers to entry into 
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the moneylending activity. By making us more skeptical about the trickle-down 
effects of subsidies to formal credit, our results provide support for the view that 
in order to increase poor households' access to capital, the formal sector must lend 
to them directly. This is the motivation of group lending programs, such as the 
Grameen Bank, which try to develop low-cost substitutes for the mechanisms used 
in the informal sector to screen borrowers and enforce repayment. Yet another way 
to address the limited access by the poor to credit are measures to improve 
infrastructure in poor villages, if such policies make it easier for banks or 
moneylenders to screen borrowers and obtain repayment. 29 
The paper provides a new illustration of the general principle that to correct a 
market failure it is necessary to know its source. While it seems natural to respond 
to an observed problem of high rural interest rates by increasing subsidized rural 
credit, if the source of the credit market failure is costly screening, resulting in 
market power, and endogenous enforcement costs, we have shown that this 
standard policy response can actually make the market failure worse. 
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Appendix A 
A. 1. Proof of  propositions 1-3 
Here we establish the local properties of the symmetric equilibrium of Model 
II. The symmetric equilibrium is determined by the first-order condition (12), the 
free entry condition (19), and the symmetry condition, 
- ^ 
i= i= i  (A.1) 
29 See Binswanger tal. (1993) on the experience ofIndia with bank lending, and our 1993 working 
paper for analysis of a simple case where subsidies to institutional credit are ineffective in improving 
the terms offered by moneylenders, but investments in infrastructure are effective. 
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Substituting (A. 1) into the first-order condition, the identity 
qJ('I, LN ,G)  = 0 (A.2) 
results. Substituting (A.1) into the free entry condition, the identity 
A('~,N,G) =- v('~,N,G) - H( G) = 0 (A.3) 
results. We list below the six partial derivatives of ~b and A: 
qJo = -F" [miz  + mz'] < 0 
q,~= q,i + q,~ < 0 
where the latter sign follows from (16); 
m 
~PN = --eN-- [ z[ i -- F' ] -- e] -- mie N-  m[ ezNZ' + eiu ] 
1 
L 
- F" -~[miz  + mz' ] 
identical to (17) and ambiguous in sign; 
A G=F ' (K+G-6-mz) -F ' (K+G)=- [6+mz]F '>O 
where the approximation is a first-order Taylor expansion; 
a~=v~=m~[z[ i -F ' ] -e ]  >0 
from (21); and 
m 
AN=VN = -~[z [ i -F ' ] -e ]  -meN <O 
from (20). 
Total differentiating (A.2) and (A.3) with respect o the policy variable, G, and 
writing these equations in matrix form, shows that 
I l i VN dN - -  A o 
Td 
Using Cramer's rule and rearranging using (22), the comparative statics rela- 
tions d i /dG and dN/dG are implicitly defined by 
~VN-d- ~ = -VN ~C + tPN ~ (A.4) 
and 
- Vu~-~ = A c + v i (A.5) 
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Notice that the multiplier of d~/dG and that of dN/dG are strictly positive (using 
(22)). 
The proofs will refer to five distinct effects on which the comparative statics 
relations depend: 
1. The differential effect of an increase in the subsidized credit ration, G, on the 
moneylender and on the large landowner who is not a moneylender, Ac~ 
- F"[ 8 + mz ] > O; 
O(mz) O(mz) 
2. Cost of capital effects, - F " - -  < 0 and - F" - -  < 0; 
Oi ON 
3. The enforcement cost effect of entry, --mieN--m[ezNz'+eiN], which is 
ambiguous in sign; 
4. The effect of entry on monopoly power, E N > O; and 
5. The strategic interaction effect among moneylenders m~ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The first term within the curly brackets of (A.4) is a 
direct cost of capital effect, ~ba = -F"O(mz)/Oi  < 0, which tends to reduce ~. The 
second term within the curly brackets of (A.4) has the same sign as ~b N. The sign 
of ~b n depends on the relative magnitudes of three effects: an indirect cost of 
capital effect ( -F"~mz) /ON) ,  the enforcement cost effect, and the monopoly 
power effect of entry. If  ~b N < 0, then the right-hand side of (A.4) is negative, 
which implies d~/dG < 0. See the lower part of Fig. 7, where ON < 0 is reflected 
in the fact that the ~(N,G) curve slopes down. In the alternative case, a positive 
enforcement cost effect dominates o that ON > 0. See Fig. 4(A,B), where f is 
increasing in N. The perverse result dt /dG > 0 obtains if the product of ~b N and 
ON/OG = Aa/ [ -  v N ] (which is always strictly positive) dominates the direct cost 
of capital effect: 
see Fig. 4(A). • 
Proof of Proposition 2. If there is no strategic interaction among moneylenders 
(i.e., m i = 0 so v~ = 0), then each moneylender's profits are independent of the 
interest rates set by others. The only non-zero term in the right-hand side of (A.5) 
is A o, the differential effect on the moneylender and on the large landowner who 
is not a moneylender. It follows from A o > 0 that dN/dG > O. 
But with strategic interaction among moneylenders, we have v i > 0 and so 
v~bq/[ - ~b;]] < 0. (For given i and N, i falls as G expands, and the lower value 
of i that other moneylenders choose lowers v.) If the latter effect is larger in 
absolute value than the differential effect, it follows from (A.5) that moneylenders 
exit as formal credit expands. See the upper part of Fig. 7, where the strategic 
interaction effect implies a smaller shift up in V0 than in H0  as G expands. • 
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Proof of Proposition 3. Totally differentiating (A.3) shows that 
d? dN 
A G + v~ dG = - vN dG 
Since A G > O, v~ > O, and v N < O, exit implies d i /dG < O. • 
Appendix B 
Proof of proposition 5. Proposition 5 follows from two lemmas. 
Lemma 1. Under the collectivist strategy at ~-= 0, for/3 sufficiently high and for 
any value of b, a moneylender is willing to lend to individuals who have not 
defaulted in the past. 
Proof of Lemma 1. From the continuity argument in the text, there exists for any 
possible value of b a unique value _~(b)< 1 such that if /3 >/3(b), then 
moneylending to an individual with no history of default is profitable under the 
collectivist strategy. This is true for any possible value of b and, in particular, for 
b = 1. But if moneylending is profitable at /3 >/3(1) and b = 1, then it is also 
profitable at /3 >/3(1) and b < 1, since a fall in b lowers e *, which increases the 
moneylender's gain from lending. •
Lemma 2. Under the collectivist strategy at ~-= 0, for any value of /3 and for b 
sufficiently high, a moneylender is unwilling to lend to individuals who have 
defaulted in the past. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Under the collectivist strategy, the future lifetime expected 
utility of an individual who has defaulted in the past, who is currently attached to a 
moneylender, and who will repay in the future, is 
W r ~ ur -~- /3 [1 - b ] ~ .r r 
Notice that V¢r is only the utility the individual obtains from transactions with 
his current moneylender, since he does not expect any other moneylender to be 
willing to lend to him. 
The borrower's best response is to repay if 
IV r > u d -  e + wd[~=O = U d -  e 
Substituting and rearranging yields the enforcement effort necessary to induce 
repayment from a borrower with a bad credit history: 
e>ud- -ur - - /3ur [  ~?1 b ] 
-- 1-- -b ]  -e**  
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The payoff  to lending at terms (z , i )  to an individual with a bad credit history is 
z [ i -F ' ] - -e**  
[ l -b  ] (1 .6 )  
=z[ i -F ' ] - [ua -ur ]+~ur  1 - 13[-i -- b] 
(A.6) is monotonical ly decreasing in b. (24b) states that z[ i - F ' ]  - u J - u r < 
0. It fol lows immediately that at b = 1 (i.e., no moneylender continues in the 
market for more than one period), (A.6) is negative. At b = 0 (i.e., no moneylen- 
der ever leaves the market), e**  = e* I~0 ,  and the moneylender 's  payoff  is 
strictly positive. By continuity, b exists, b is implicit ly defined by setting (A.6) 
equal to zero. b > b implies e**  so fflgh that the moneylender 's  payoff  is 
negative. But for e set below e * *, say at e * in (25), a borrower with a bad credit 
history would not  repay. Col lectivist beliefs are thus self-fulfi l l ing. •
References 
Aleem, I., 1990, Imperfect information, screening and the costs of informal ending: A study of rural 
credit markets in Pakistan, World Bank Economic Review 4, 329-349. 
Austin, G., 1993, Indigenous credit institutions in West Africa, c.1750-c.1960, in: G. Austin and K. 
Sugihara, eds., Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750-1960 (St. Martin's Press. New 
York). 
Basu, K., 1994, Rural credit and interlinkage: Implications for rural poverty, agrarian efficiency, and 
public policy, DEP Working Paper No. 54, London School of Economics. 
Bell, C., 1990, Interactions between institutional and informal credit agencies in rural India, World 
Bank Economic Review 4, 297-327. 
Bhaduri, A., 1987, Moneylenders, pp. 526-527 in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, eds., The 
New Palgrave, A Dictionary of Economics (Macmillan, London). 
Binswanger, H.P., S.R. Khandker and M.R. Rosenzweig, 1993, How infrastructure and financial 
institutions affect agricultural output and investment in India, Journal of Development Economics 
41, 337-366. 
Bolnick, B., 1992, Moneylenders and informal financial markets in Malawi, World Development 20, 
57-68. 
Bose, P., 1994, Formal-informal sector interaction in rural credit markets, State University of New 
York at Cortland, mimeo. 
Conning, J., 1994, Linked contracts as collateral substitutes: Theory and some evidence from the 
market for farm finance in Chile, Ph.D. thesis, Yale University. 
de Meza, D. and J.R. Gould, 1992, The social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights, 
Journal of Political Economy, 100, 561-580. 
de Meza, D., J. Maloney and G. Myles, 1995, Price-reducing taxation, Economics Letters 47, 77-81. 
Diamond, P., 1971, A model of price adjustment, Journal of Economic Theory 3, 156-168. 
Floro, S. and D. Ray, 1997, Vertical links between formal and inlormal financial institutions: An 
analytical approach, Review of Development Economics, forthcoming. 
Floro, S. and P. Yotopoulos, 1991, Informal Credit Markets and the New Institutional Economics: The 
Case of Philippine Agriculture (Westview Press, Boulder, CO). 
Greif, A., 1994, Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection 
on collectivist and individualist societies, Journal of Political Economy 102, 912-950. 
518 K. Hoff, J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Development Economics 52 (1997) 429-462 
Hoff, K. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1993a, Imperfect information and rural credit markets: Puzzles and policy 
perspectives, pp. 33-52 in: K. Hoff, A. Braverman and J.E. Stiglitz, eds., The Economics of Rural 
Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy (Oxford University Press, New York). 
Hoff, K. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1993b, A theory of imperfect competition in rural credit markets in 
developing countries, University of Maryland, IRIS working paper #78. 
Horstmann, I.J. and J.M. Markusen, 1986, Up the average cost curve: Inefficient entry and the new 
protectionism, Journal of International Economics 20, 225-247. 
Jain, S., 1995, The interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries: 
Symbiosis versus crowding out, mimeo. 
Klein, D.B., 1992, Promise keeping in the great society: A model of credit information sharing, 
Economics and Politics 4, 117-136. 
Klein, B. and K.B. Leffler, 1981, The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance, 
Journal of Political Economy 89, 615-641. 
Lipton, M., 1976, Agricultural finance and rural credit in poor countries, World Development 4,
543-553. 
Lipton, M. and J. Toye, 1989, Does Aid Work in India? (Routledge, London). 
Nagarajan, G., 1992, Informal credit markets in Philippine rice-growing areas, Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State 
University. 
Onchan, T., 1992, Informal rural finance in Thailand, in: D. Adams and D.A. Fitchett, eds., Informal 
Finance in Low-Income Countries (Westview Press, Boulder, CO). 
Satterthwaite, M., 1979, Consumer information, equilibrium industry price, and the number of sellers, 
Bell Journal of Economics 10, 483-502. 
Shapiro, C. and J.E. Stiglitz, 1984, Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device, American 
Economic Review 74, 433-444. 
Sharma, P., 1985, Borrowing costs, debt capacity and demand for agricultural finance in Fiji, Savings 
and Development 9, 459-467. 
Siamwalla, A., C. Pinthong, N. Poapongsakorn, P. Satsanguan, P. Nettayarak, W. Mingmaneenakin a d 
Y. Tubpun, 1990, The Thai rural credit system: Public subsidies, private information, and 
segmented markets, World Bank Economic Review 4, 271-296. 
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss, 1981, Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, American 
Economic Review 71,383-410. 
Walker, T.S. and Ryan, J.G., 1990, Village and Household Economies in India's Semi-Arid Tropics 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore). 
Williamson, S., 1987, Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium credit rationing, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 102, 135-146. 
